Subsidy in Supply Chain of Electric Vehicles:A Comprehensive Perspective






  冯博,苏州大学商学院院长、教授、博导,曾任华南理工大学决策科学系系主任、教授、博导。长期从事运营管理与决策分析领域的研究,近几年针对电动汽车运营、航空货运能力及收益管理、平台经济、以及运营与信息系统和营销的交叉领域的新问题展开研究。国家优秀青年基金获得者、中组部青年拔尖人才、教育部新世纪优秀人才、广东省杰出青年基金获得者、广东省文化英才、千百十人才工程省级层次、江苏省双创人才。中国管理科学与工程学会服务科学与工程分会副理事长/副主任委员、中国工业工程与管理学会常务理事、江苏省运筹学学会常务理事。多年来致力于运营管理与决策分析领域的研究,主持和参与国家社科重大项目、国家自然科学基金重大项目、国际合作重点项目、面上项目等10余项。在MIS Quarterly,Decision Sciences Journal,European Journal of Operational Research,Omega,Journal of Business Research等本领知名期刊发表学术期刊论文60余篇、出版专著2部。获教育部第七届高等学校科学研究。


Many governments develop subsidy programs to overcome the barriers and stimulate the development of electric vehicle (EV) industry. A key question for governments is who should be subsidized with two subsidy mechanisms (fixed amount and price discount) in EV industry. This study discusses the subsidy problem in an EV supply chain consisted of a manufacturer, a retailer and consumers,which extends current understanding on traditional subsidy by providing a comprehensive supply chain perspective. Results show that the optimal subsidy object depends on subsidy mechanisms and government’s targets. In addition, relevant factors also have impacts on optimal object choice. However, in most cases, fixed subsidy outperforms price-discount subsidy. If EVs are high price-sensitive product, manufacture is the optimal subsidy object to improve R&D level and stimulate demand. Otherwise, government should subsidize consumer. From perspective of alleviating consumer actual expense, optimal subsidy object depends on the interaction of various industry factors under government fixed subsidy mechanism. This research sheds lights on the subsidy object choice under different subsidy mechanisms in an EV supply chain, reveals the optimal subsidy policy and lends practical support to solve the chicken-and-egg problems in EV industry development.